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David A. Wise 
This volume contains papers presented at the National Bureau of  Economic 
Research conference on the economics of aging in Carefree, Arizona, in April 
1990. It is the third in a series of  conference volumes associated with the 
NBER’s ongoing project on the economics of aging. The first volume was The 
Economics of  Aging (1989); the second was Issues in the Economics of  Aging 
(1990). (Both were published by the University of Chicago Press.) The goal 
of the Economics of Aging Project is to further our understanding of the con- 
sequences for older people and for the population at large of an aging popula- 
tion. This volume pursued analysis of  several of the issues addressed in the 
previous volumes and considers several new topics as well. This introduction 
summarizes the motivation for the papers and their principal findings. Much 
of the text is abstracted from the papers themselves. 
Retirement 
A great deal of effort has been devoted in recent years to the development 
of models of retirement that emphasize the need to compare present with fu- 
ture circumstances in deciding whether to retire. Some versions of these mod- 
els are numerically complex, while others are much simpler. In “Three Mod- 
els  of  Retirement: Computational Complexity  versus  Predictive  Validity,” 
Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise consider whether 
more complex models predict the actual retirement behavior of  individuals 
better than less complex models. They conclude that retirement from the firm 
that they consider is poorly predicted by the simplest model but that the most 
complex model does no better than one that is numerically much simpler to 
implement. They  also show that  estimates of  the effects on  retirement of 
changes in Social Security provisions are very inaccurate if firm pension plan 
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provisions are not also accounted for-as  has been the case in previous anal- 
yses of  Social Security. 
Empirical  analysis often raises  questions of  approximation to underlying 
individual behavior.  Closer approximation may require more complex statis- 
tical specifications. On the other hand, more complex specifications may pre- 
sume computational facility that is beyond the grasp of most real people and 
therefore less consistent with the actual rules that govern their behavior, even 
though economic theory may lead analysts to increasingly complex specifica- 
tions. Thus, the issue is not only whether more complex models are worth the 
effort but also whether they are better.  The answer must necessarily depend 
on the behavior that the analysis is intended to predict. In their paper, Lums- 
daine, Stock, and Wise consider the relation between computational complex- 
ity and the predictive validity of  three models of retirement behavior. 
Retirement has been the subject of a large number of  studies over the past 
decade. Most have emphasized the effect of Social Security provisions on re- 
tirement  age, but a wide range of  methods has been  employed. The earlier 
studies in this time period were based on regression or multinomial logit anal- 
ysis. Subsequent analysis relied on nonlinear budget constraint formulations 
of  the  retirement  decision  and on proportional  hazard  model  formulations. 
More recently, several authors have developed models that focus on forward- 
looking comparison of the advantages of retirement at alternative ages in the 
future and on the updating of information as persons age. Although the spirit 
of these latter models is basically the same, they vary widely in computational 
complexity.  The potential  advantages  in predictive validity of the computa- 
tionally more complex versions of these models are the primary  motivation 
for this  study, although  to broaden  the scope of  the comparison the authors 
consider a much simpler model as well. 
They compare the predictive  validity  of  three models of retirement.  The 
first is a simple probit model. The second is the “option value” model devel- 
oped in earlier papers by Stock and Wise. The third is a stochastic dynamic 
programming model. 
The analysis is guided by several key ideas. First, all the models are theo- 
retical abstractions; none of them can be reasonably thought of as “true.” The 
important consideration is which decision rule is the best approximation to the 
calculations that govern actual individual behavior.  In this paper, judgments 
on which rule is best are based on empirical evidence on the relation between 
model specification and predictive validity. 
Second, the models vary substantially in the computational complexity of 
the decision rules that they attribute to individual decision makers. The option 
value  and the dynamic programming  rules are both  intended to capture the 
same underlying  idea,  but  implementation  of  dynamic programming  rules 
typically  implies considerably  more computational  complexity  than  imple- 
mentation of the option value rule. The option value model makes a simplify- 3  Introduction 
ing  assumption that  substantially  reduces  complexity.  The probit  model  is 
much simpler than either of these. 
Third, although the mathematically  correct implementation of some deci- 
sion rules requires dynamic programming, there is no single dynamic pro- 
gramming rule. The implied computational complexity depends in important 
ways on specific assumptions, in particular the disturbance term correlation 
structure.  It is easier to incorporate more flexible correlation assumptions in 
the option value than in the dynamic programming  formulations.  Thus, for 
example, the option value  specification  may  be a suboptimal  solution to a 
dynamic programming rule that implies computational complexity difficult to 
implement even with a computer. 
A question of practical importance is therefore whether different decision 
rules yield significantly different results. 
The comparisons in this paper are made by  estimating the models on the 
same data. The data, which pertain to the retirement decisions in a large For- 
rune 500 firm, have two important advantages. First, the retirement decisions 
can be related to the provisions of the firm’s pension plan, and it is therefore 
possible to simulate the effect of changes in the pension plan provisions. Sec- 
ond, the firm offered an unanticipated “window” plan in one of  the years cov- 
ered by the data. 
The principal measure of the predictive validity of the models is how well 
they predict the effects of the window plan. Like the typical defined benefit 
pension plan, this firm’s plan provides substantial incentives to retire early. In 
addition, the window plan provided further incentive to retire early. Window 
plans, which have been offered by many firms in recent years, provide special 
bonuses to workers in a specific group-often  defined by age, occupational 
group, or even a division within the firm-if  the worker retires within a spec- 
ified period of time, typically a year or less. The window plan allows a unique 
external test of the predictive validity of the models; it is possible to compare 
model predictions with actual retirement rates under the window plan. 
The authors begin by obtaining model parameter estimates based on retire- 
ment decisions in a year (1980) prior to the window plan. They then use these 
estimates to predict retirement in a later year (1982) under the window plan. 
The estimates and predictions are based on male nonmanagerial employees. 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise find that the option value and dynamic pro- 
gramming models are considerably more successful  than the less complex 
probit model in approximating the rules that individuals use to make retire- 
ment decisions but that the more complex dynamic programming rule approx- 
imates behavior no better than the simpler option value rule. The authors cau- 
tion that definitive conclusions will have to await accumulated evidence based 
on additional comparisons using different data sets and with respect to differ- 
ent pension plan provisions. 
The authors also use their analysis to show that predictions of the retirement 4  David A. Wise 
effects of changes in Social Security provisions are likely to be grossly inac- 
curate if the analysis does not consider both Social Security and firm pension 
plan provisions.  Firm plan  provisions  have been unavailable to researchers 
analyzing the effects of changes in the Social Security system. 
Saving for Retirement 
In “Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth,” Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. 
Shoven consider past returns to stocks versus bonds. They present strong evi- 
dence that systematic contributions proportional to earnings over a career have 
always led to more wealth  at the time of retirement  if the investment is in 
stocks rather than bonds. 
For many people, the present value of their future pension annuity is their 
largest financial asset. The retirement  income may come from a variety  of 
pension accumulations, including defined contribution plans, defined benefit 
plans, individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, and tax-deferred annuity 
plans.  With many of  these accumulation  vehicles,  the individual participant 
bears the responsibility  of determining the assets in which the funds are in- 
vested and bears any uncertainty about the rate of return that will be realized 
on those assets. In choosing between  stocks and bonds for their pension  ac- 
cumulation vehicle, most people probably know that bonds have a lower av- 
erage return and a lower variance in return; bonds offer additional “safety” at 
the expense of  a lower expected outcome. While this risk-return trade-off is 
both correct and well understood for short-term investment horizons, the ex- 
tent to which it applies for long holding periods is not clear. For many work- 
ers, the time between the current contribution to the retirement account and 
the purchase of an annuity is thirty years or more. What is the relative risk and 
return on stocks versus bonds for such a long horizon? The pension participant 
typically  not  only  has a  long  horizon  but  also makes  many  contributions 
throughout his or her career. For example, faculty at Stanford University make 
payments to their retirement  accounts twice each month over their term of 
employment. How does such a pattern of purchase affect the relative desira- 
bility  of  stocks versus bonds as pension  accumulation  assets? Finally, most 
individual retirement  accounts, Keogh plans,  and defined contribution plans 
allow the participant not only to choose which assets are purchased with new 
contributions but also to move  existing  accumulations  between  asset cate- 
gories. This raises the question of  the desirability of gradually moving stock 
accumulations into bonds late in one’s career. Such an option offers the poten- 
tial advantage that one’s retirement annuity would depend on the value of  the 
stock portfolio at several selling dates rather than just its value on the date of 
purchase of the annuity. 
MaCurdy and Shoven examine how some naive investment strategies for 
pension  accumulations would  have  performed for employment  careers of 
varying length between  1926 and  1989. Given a strategy, they calculate the 5  Introduction 
implied value for the pension account at the time of retirement for all possiiole 
completed careers of  a specified horizon within the sixty-four-year period. 
They consider only strategies in which investors allocate their pension contri- 
butions either entirely into stocks (with all dividends and other returns rein- 
vested  in  stocks) or entirely into bonds (with interest reinvested in bonds). 
These strategies are not optimal in any sense since they ignore any market 
timing issues as well as standard portfolio theory. They then consider some 
strategies for converting from stocks to bonds as a worker approaches retire- 
ment, but they do not attempt to determine the optimal portfolio composition 
as a function of years until retirement. Despite these limitations, they find that 
an “all stocks” strategy dominates all other investment policies considered for 
all career lengths of twenty-five years or longer. By “domination,” they mean 
that an all stocks allocation would have generated a larger pension accumula- 
tion for every career that ended in retirement over the period 1926-89. 
MaCurdy and Shoven’s findings have important implications for pension 
investment policies, and they suggest that the vast majority of people choose 
the wrong accumulation strategies. Not  only are their results applicable to 
defined contribution plans, but they are also relevant for defined benefit pen- 
sion programs and for other long-horizon saving targets. 
All the material presented in the paper is from the point of view of a partic- 
ipant in a defined contribution pension system. However, it is applicable to a 
wider class of problems, including the funding of  defined benefit retirement 
plans by  corporations. The findings simply say that systematic contributions 
proportional to earnings over a career have always led to more wealth at the 
time of  retirement if  the investments are in  stocks rather than bonds. This 
information seems completely relevant to an employer who has promised re- 
tirement benefits based on final salary and years of service. The defined ben- 
efits can be funded with smaller cash contributions owing to the higher rates 
of return earned on stocks over long horizons. 
Not  only has an all stocks strategy always bested an all bonds one for all 
careers exceeding twenty-five years, but it has also always yielded more than 
the popular f3ty-fifty  allocation or any other constant mix of  stock and bond 
purchases. While  it  is  impossible to predict the  likelihood that this domi- 
nance will continue, the evidence favoring stocks for long horizons is over- 
whelming. 
Living Arrangements and Family Support 
1. In “Health, Children, and Elderly Living Arrangements: A Multiperiod- 
Multinomial F’robit  Model  with  Unobserved Heterogeneity and Autocorre- 
lated Errors,” Axel Borsch-Supan, Vassilis Hajivassiliou, Laurence J. Kotli- 
koff, and John N. Morris develop a model of living arrangements that should 
have wide applications in future research in this area. The model overcomes 
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alistic models in past research. The paper also confirms that living arrange- 
ments are predominantly governed by functional ability and to a lesser degree 
by age. A surprising result is that changes in marital status have little effect on 
the choice of living arrangement, after controlling for other family character- 
istics. 
Decisions by  the elderly regarding their living arrangements (e.g., living 
alone, living with children, or living in a nursing home) seem best modeled 
as a discrete choice problem in which  the elderly view  certain choices as 
closer substitutes than others. For example, living with children may  more 
closely substitute for living independently than living in an institution does. 
Unobserved determinants of living arrangements at a point in time are, there- 
fore, quite likely to be correlated. In the parlance of discrete choice models, 
this means that the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) will be violated. Indeed, a number of recent studies of living arrange- 
ments of the elderly document the violation of this assumption. 
In addition to relaxing the independence assumption of  no intratemporal 
correlation between unobserved  determnants of  competing  living arrange- 
ments, the authors also relax the assumption of no intertemporal correlation 
of  such determinants. The assumption of no intertemporal correlation under- 
lies most  studies of  living arrangements, particularly those estimated with 
cross-sectional data. While cross-sectional variation in  household character- 
istics can provide important insights into the determinants of living arrange- 
ments, the living arrangement decision is clearly an intertemporal one. Be- 
cause of moving and associated transactions costs, elderly households may 
stay longer in inappropriate living arrangements than they would in the ab- 
sence of such costs. In turn, households may prospectively move into an insti- 
tution “before it is too late to cope with this change.” That is, households may 
be substantially out of  long-run equilibrium if a cross-sectional survey inter- 
views them shortly before or after a move. Moreover, persons may acquire a 
taste for certain types of living arrangements. Such habit formation introduces 
state dependence. Ideally, therefore, living arrangement choices should be es- 
timated with panel data, with an appropriate econometric specification of in- 
tertemporal linkages. 
These intertemporal linkages include two components. The first component 
is the linkage through  unobserved person-specific attributes, that is,  unob- 
served heterogeneity through time-invariant error components. An important 
example is health status, information on which is often missing or unsatisfac- 
tory in household surveys. Health status varies over time but has an important 
person-specific, time-invariant component that influences housing and living 
arrangement choices of the elderly. 
However, not all intertemporal correlation patterns in unobservables can be 
captured  by  time-invariant error  components.  A  second  error  component 
should, therefore, be included to control for time-varying disturbances, for 7  Introduction 
example, an autoregressive error structure. Examples of the source of  error 
components that taper off  over time are the cases of prospective moves and 
habit formation mentioned above. Similar effects on the error structure arise 
when, owing to unmeasured transactions costs, an elderly person stays longer 
in a dwelling than he or she would in the absence of such costs. 
While researchers have recognized the need to estimate choice models with 
unobserved determinants that are correlated across alternatives and over time, 
they have been daunted by the high dimensional integration of the associated 
likelihood functions. This paper uses a new simulation method developed by 
Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou to estimate the likelihood functions of living 
arrangement choice models that range, in their error structure, from the very 
simple to the highly complex. 
The simulated likelihood method  works well  and  requires  a very  small 
number of  replications. It easily accommodates highly complex error struc- 
tures and can handle different error structures without major programming 
effort 
Two  main conclusions follow from the estimation results. First, a careful 
specification of the temporal error process dramatically improves the model 
fit. It also appears that ignoring intertemporal linkages biases some parameter 
estimates, although the different specifications produce qualitatively similar 
coefficients on the substantive parameters. 
Second, living arrangement choices are governed predominantly by  func- 
tional ability and to a lesser degree by age. The analysis confirms that institu- 
tions are an inferior living arrangement as measured by  a the willingness to 
spend more in order to avoid entering one. A somewhat surprising result is 
that changes in marital status do not appear to matter a great deal. 
2.  In  “The Provision of  Time  to  the  Elderly by  Their Children,” Axel 
Borsch-Supan, Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and John N. Mor- 
ris consider the time that children spend with their parents. They conclude 
that time spent with parents is determined primarily by demographic factors, 
such as the age of the parent, but that economic factors such as income and 
wealth play an insignificant role. 
There is substantial evidence that support of  parents by  children has de- 
clined in the postwar period. Over 60 percent of the elderly (those over 60) 
now live alone, compared with only 25 percent in the 1940s. For the old old 
(those over 85),  the fraction living alone has increased from 13 to 57 percent. 
At the same time, there has been more than a tripling of the rate of  institution- 
alization; today almost one-quarter of  the old old live in institutions, com- 
pared with  only 7 percent in the  1940s. In addition to not living with  the 
elderly, the children of the elderly rarely provide financial transfers to the el- 
derly, and when they do, the amounts are typically quite meager. 
One defense of the children’s behavior is demographic; the current number 
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1940s. Since the elderly of today had fewer children than did their parents and 
have, in some cases, succeeded in outliving their children, the current situa- 
tion may be of their own making. A second defense is that the relative in- 
come position of  the elderly has improved, permitting them to live alone 
and obviating the need for financial transfers from their children. A variety of 
studies have demonstrated that current poverty rates of  the elderly are close 
to, if  not below, those of  the nonelderly. Much of  the improvement in  the 
relative incomes of the elderly is due to increases in real Social Security ben- 
efits legislated in the 1970s. A third point to consider in assessing child sup- 
port of the elderly involves payment for nursing home care. A good fraction 
of  the elderly in nursing homes are private pay patients. Some of these pay- 
ments are being made directly by children. It seems plausible that such pay- 
ments per child measured at constant dollars have increased over time. 
The authors emphasize that, while the elderly may need and appear to be 
receiving less financial help from their children, their needs for companion- 
ship and physical assistance may well have increased in the postwar period; 
the increased longevity of  the elderly often means living for years in  poor 
states of  health. In addition, those elderly who continue to live will lose a 
large fraction of their old friends and even some of  their children along the 
way. Most studies of the increasingly separate living arrangements of the el- 
derly conclude that these arrangements reflect the preferences and improved 
financial means of the elderly. In contrast, Kotlikoff and Moms suggested in 
prior research that about half the elderly would prefer to live with their chil- 
dren but continue to live apart because of their children’s preferences coupled 
with their children’s financial abilities to live apart from their parents. 
One reason the jury remains out on family support of the aged involves the 
issue of time spent by children with their elderly parents. Children’s provision 
of time to their elderly parents is an important, if not the most important, form 
of  economic transfer to the elderly by  their children. This papers studies the 
provision of time by children to their elderly parents. The authors use the 1986 
Hebrew Rehabilitation  Center for the Aged (HRCA) follow-up survey of Mas- 
sachusetts elderly and the 1986 HRC-NBER survey of  the children of  these 
Massachusetts elderly. 
They use these data to answer a number of questions about the provision of 
time by  children to their parents. These questions include, How does the 
health status of  the elderly influence the amount of time given by  children? 
How does the health status of the children influence their provision of time to 
their parents? Do parents with more income and  wealth receive more time 
from their children? How do the employment status and wage rates of children 
affect their provision of time? Do children free ride on their siblings’ provision 
of time? Are home care corporations used by children as a substitute for their 
own time? Do the institutionalized elderly receive more or less time? Are 
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The data reveal some clear patterns of time transfers from children to their 
elderly parents. Children appear to use institutions and home care as a substi- 
tute for their own provision of time. Parents who reside in nursing homes or 
are enrolled in home care programs receive, ceteris paribus, less than half the 
amount of time received by those in the community. The provision of time is 
strongly correlated with the age of the elderly parent; other things being equal, 
the old old receive over twice the time of the young old. 
The sex, age, and health status of children are additional important deter- 
minants of time provided to the elderly. Male children and younger children 
spend relatively little time with their parents. Children with poor health spend 
almost no time with their parents. If  the spouse of  a child is in poor health, 
the child also gives very little time, at least according to the model results. 
Other things being equal, those elderly who report their health to be “poor” 
receive over twice the amount of  time received by  elderly with better self- 
reports of health. Surprisingly, the degree of elderly disability does not appear 
to affect the amount of  time provided to those elderly not living with their 
children, although it is a significant determinant in the larger sample that in- 
cludes elderly living with their children. 
The results for the entire sample of  children, including those living with 
their elderly parents, indicate that more time is provided by  single children 
and more time is received by  single elderly, at least those who are widowed. 
There is strong evidence that widowed children spend substantially more time 
with their elderly parents. 
The estimates indicate a small effect associated with higher children’s wage 
rates; children with higher wage rates provide somewhat less time to their 
elderly parents than other children. In contrast to the modest effect of higher 
wage rates, the effect of  larger values of  children’s wealth is quite sizable. 
Wealthier children and children with higher incomes appear to provide less 
time than poorer children, but the effects are not precisely measured. 
To summarize, the results indicate that the main determinants of the amount 
of time given to parents are demographic. Economic variables, such as wage 
rate and income levels, appear to play an insignificant role in the provision of 
time. 
On The Life-Cycle Model 
In “Wealth Depletion and Life-Cycle Consumption by the Elderly,” Michael 
D. Hurd considers evidence in  the Retirement History Survey (RHS) with 
respect to life-cycle theory. He argues that the data are consistent with life- 
cycle theory but that they offer no support for a bequest motive as an impor- 
tant determinant of the consumption and saving behavior of the elderly. 
Although  the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) of  consumption has been  the 10  David A. Wise 
most important theory for the study of saving behavior, interest in the bequest 
motive for saving has grown considerably. This has been stimulated by three 
kinds of  empirical results. (1) In simulations of  lifetime earnings and con- 
sumption trajectories, “reasonable” utility function parameter values lead to 
savings that are considerably smaller than observed household wealth. This 
implies that a good deal of  household wealth has been inherited. Although, 
when the date of death is unknown, large inheritances are not necessarily in- 
consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, many people believe they indicate 
that at least part of the bequests are intentional. (2) From estimated earnings 
and consumption paths it is found that as much as 80 percent of household 
wealth is inherited. (3) The elderly do not seem to dissave as they age. Be- 
cause this contradicts a prediction of  the life-cycle hypothesis, it has been 
taken to be particularly damaging to the hypothesis. 
In this paper, Hurd first reviews some evidence on how wealth changes as 
the elderly age. He argues that the best evidence is that the elderly do dissave 
as required by  the life-cycle hypothesis. He then presents findings based on 
consumption data in the RHS. Hurd concludes that, as measured in the RHS, 
consumption declines as households age, which is in accordance with the life- 
cycle hypothesis. If  a bequest motive for saving is an important determinant 
of consumption, the consumption paths of parents and nonparents should dif- 
fer, but no systematic difference between their consumption paths is found. 
Hurd’s overall conclusion is that the wealth and consumption data in the RHS 
are consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis; they do not support a role for a 
bequest  motive as a determinant of  consumption behavior. Hurd also con- 
cludes that  in the RHS, observations on both consumption and wealth are 
consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption in that both are ob- 
served to decline after retirement. 
While the findings that consumption and wealth decline with age are con- 
sistent with the LCH, they are not inconsistent with a bequest motive for sav- 
ing: the bequest motive will change the shape and level of  the consumption 
and wealth paths, but they will not necessarily rise. A test for the importance 
of the bequest motive is based on the assumption that the marginal utility of 
bequests of a parent is greater than the marginal utility of bequests of  a non- 
parent. This assumption implies that, ceteris paribus, the wealth and con- 
sumption paths of a parent should decline more slowly than the wealth and 
consumption paths of a nonparent. In the RHS, the wealth paths decline at the 
same rate. 
In short, Hurd concludes that the RHS data on wealth and consumption 
are consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis of  consumption but that they of- 
fer no support for a bequest motive for saving as an important determinant 
of consumption behavior. Hurd also gives considerable attention to the sub- 
stantial measurement problems that plague analysis based on consumption 
data. 11  Introduction 
Aging Issues in Developing Countries 
In  “Patterns of Aging in Thailand and C6te d’Ivoire,” Angus Deaton and 
Christina  H.  Paxson  consider  aging  issues  in  less  developed  countries 
(LDCs). They emphasize the important differences between developed and 
less developed countries and the implications of  these differences for under- 
standing aging issues and for appropriate directions for research. They draw 
attention to several issues and questions, emphasizing in particular that the 
life-cycle model of saving and capital accumulation cannot be applied without 
modification to economies where the functions of households are very differ- 
ent from those in developed countries. 
The authors present and discuss facts about older people in two contrasting 
developing countries, C6te d’Ivoire and Thailand. They are concerned with 
standard questions in the aging literature, namely, demographic structure, liv- 
ing arrangements, urbanization, illness, labor force behavior, and economic 
status. In this paper, they do not attempt to go beyond the presentation of data 
from a series of household surveys from the two countries. Although recent 
years have seen increased attention in the demographic and sociological liter- 
atures to questions of aging in LDCs, data are still relatively scarce, particu- 
larly for Africa, and the authors see their current task as providing stylized 
facts to help focus further discussion. 
There are two research issues that provide the structure for their discussion: 
household  saving behavior and,  more broadly,  the economics of  aging  in 
countries with low living standards but with rapidly expanding shares of  old 
people in the population. 
Research on saving behavior in the United States, Japan, and Western Eu- 
rope has been dominated by  permanent income and life-cycle models since 
their introduction in the 1950s. There has been a good deal less work done on 
household saving behavior in LDCs, and much of the work that has been done 
has simply transferred the analytic framework from the more to the less devel- 
oped context. It is not clear that this is the best way of  proceeding. While it 
makes sense to work with the same basic ideas-that  saving can smooth con- 
sumption over time and that assets provide a measure of insurance against an 
uncertain  future-there  are  important  differences  in  environment  and  in 
mechanisms, and the same aims may therefore be achieved in very different 
ways. A much larger share of  the population in developing countries is en- 
gaged in agriculture, where incomes are very variable, and there are many 
poor people living close to the subsistence level, so consumption insurance 
may be of the greatest importance. 
The authors find that their exploration of the data allows them to summarize 
some of what is known and what might usefully be learned: 
1. Questions regarding the economic status of  the old in LDCs cannot be 
answered and must be rethought. In more developed countries, where perhaps 12  David A. Wise 
nine-tenths of the elderly live by themselves or with elderly spouses, house- 
hold surveys can tell us a great deal about their living standards. In LDCs, to 
a greater or lesser degree, older people do not live by themselves, and until a 
method can be found for measuring intrahousehold allocations, we have no 
method of assigning welfare levels to them or indeed to other members of the 
households in which they live. 
2. More work needs to be done on the question of  whether the source of 
income (i.e., who earns it) affects what individual members of the household 
receive. This cannot be done directly, but if  the earnings of  the elderly are 
spent differently than other household income, one should be able to detect 
that fact from consumption data. Data such as those from Thailand show con- 
siderable variation in  source of income with age, although the patterns are 
quite different from those in the United States or Western Europe. 
3. In the United States and other developed countries, where many elderly 
people live alone, there has been concern about the possible abandonment of 
the old. However, such cases seem to be rare; most old people live alone be- 
cause they want to, and frequency of contract with children is generally high. 
In CBte d’Ivoire, under current living conditions, abandonment does not seem 
common because very  few old people live alone. There are perhaps more 
grounds for concern in Thailand, but the population at risk is still small and is 
probably overstated by the survey results quoted in this paper. However, there 
is evidence from elsewhere that suggests that these results should not be gen- 
eralized to all poor countries. In many areas of India, living arrangements for 
newlyweds are strictly patrilocal, with the result that, after marriage, women 
are effectively cut off from their parents’ family. In turn, they will be looked 
after  in  old  age  by  their sons,  their  daughters having  themselves moved 
to their husbands’ families. In consequence, women who fail to produce 
sons, or fail to produce surviving sons, are likely to fall into destitution as wi- 
dows. 
4.  The living arrangements of  the elderly will vary  from place to place 
according to marriage arrangements, agroclimatic conditions, and the availa- 
bility of labor and land. In CBte d’lvoire, living patterns have been changing 
in response to the increasing scarcity of land since sons, who were previously 
guaranteed land nearby, are now often required to set up households at consid- 
erable distances. The shortage of land itself reflects a great deal of imrnigra- 
tion to the cocoa and coffee areas, an immigration that responded originally to 
labor shortage and that contributed to the destruction of the original lineage 
system of  cocoa and coffee production. One may  also wonder whether the 
pattern of inheritance in northern Thailand-whereby,  as a result of the resid- 
ual stem family system, the youngest daughter typically inherits the land- 
will continue unmodified into an era where land is increasingly scarce. 
5. Individual participation and  earnings patterns show the standard life- 
cycle hump shapes in CBte d’Ivoire and Thailand and presumably do so more 
widely.  However, households  act  so as to  make  average living standards 13  Introduction 
within households much less variable over the life cycle than are the individ- 
ual patterns. The degree to which this happens in the data is different between 
the two counties and depends on how household size is measured. Even so, 
sharing resources between household members is presumably one of the main 
economic functions of the household. What needs a great deal more research 
is the extent to which household size and composition adapt to facilitate shar- 
ing and to guarantee the best possible living standards to household members. 
In both Thailand and C6te d’Ivoire, there is a great deal of  migration, both 
seasonal and nonseasonal. In Thailand, the process of household formation is 
explicitly tied to the pressure on resources within the compound; the departure 
of a previously married child on the marriage of a younger sibling is therefore 
as much a matter of economics as of  immutable custom. In the panel house- 
holds in C6te d’Ivoire, there are major differences in membership between 
1985 and 1986. The authors emphasize that there is scope for more modeling 
here, particularly for a simple unifying  theory that explains how  potential 
household members decide how  to form household  groups given the eco- 
nomic opportunities available to them. 
6. There are a number of interactions between urbanization and age distri- 
butions. Migration tends to lead to young cities and an older countryside, as 
is the case in C6te d’Ivoire, but much urban growth in LDCs comes from 
reproductive behavior as well as from migration. The fall in  fertility in the 
demographic transition often begins in the cities, with the result that cities are 
likely to age more rapidly than more rural areas. The balances between these 
forces will produce different age distributions in different countries, for ex- 
ample, young cities in Africa and older cities in Asia, and these have a number 
of  repercussions for policy, for example, in the provision of  services as well 
as in the likely effectiveness of older people as a political force. 
7. Many LDCs are in a state of transition, not only demographic, but also 
educational. In both countries examined here, there are very large differences 
between the educational attainments of the different generations. The conse- 
quences of these differences are much less clear, and the authors do not wish 
to subscribe to the view that they always and everywhere undermine the status 
of the old. But Deaton and Paxson emphasize that models that provide a theo- 
retical framework for the role of the elderly would do well to bear these facts 
in mind. 
8. The life-cycle model  of  saving and  capital accumulation, which has 
brought so many insights in developed countries, cannot be  applied without 
modification to economies where the functions of  households are different. 
Asset accumulation for old age, with a large share of  the capital stock being 
accounted for (or not accounted for) by  life-cycle saving, is not likely to be 
a very useful model for savings in LDCs. Households can and do provide 
old-age insurance without  an obvious need to accumulate and decumulate 
assets. The authors’ data do not  suggest any run down of  assets with  the 
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have a range of  other motives for keeping control of  assets for as long as 
possible. 
9. As in developed countries, there is a pronounced household life cycle, 
with a hump-shaped income, peaking much earlier in CBte d’Ivoire than in 
Thailand. However, the authors doubt that there is much long-term consump- 
tion smoothing associated with  these humps, and they tend to attach more 
importance to saving as a means of  smoothing consumption over short-term 
fluctuations in income that are typically associated with agricultural activities. 
Indeed, the authors say,  it is possible that variations in household structure 
contribute more to long-term smoothing than do variations in assets. 
Social Security Reform 
In “Changing the Japanese Social Security System from Pay as You  Go to 
Actuarially Fair,” Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi consider the implica- 
tions of changing from the current pay-as-you-go system to one that is actu- 
arially fair. The authors note that, while the merits of a fully funded system 
are well known to economists, there is a reluctance to move from a pay-as- 
you-go to a fully funded system because the transition creates instability in 
benefit distribution and in the macro budget. The authors argue, however, that 
it is not necessary to accumulate a budget surplus to eliminate the distribu- 
tional and efficiency problems associated with a pay-as-you-go system. They 
show that  switching to an actuarially fair but unfunded system attains this 
objective. 
The current Japanese public pension system is essentially pay as you  go; 
hence, its rate of return is not actuarially fair for each participant. This is the 
root of the three problems that the Japanese public pension system faces. 
First,  the  system transfers income intergenerationally. In  particular,  the 
generation following the baby boomers is expected to make a large transfer to 
the baby boomer generation. By the year 2025, the average Japanese worker 
will have to support three times as many retirees as in  1990. This period, 
which is characterized by  a higher percentage of retirees, is referred as the 
high-average-age period (HAAP). The arrival of ttie HAAP will increase the 
required social security contributions to maintain the promised benefits, re- 
sulting in significant income redistributions among different generations. It 
may even make the very existence of the public pension system uncertain, the 
authors say. 
Second, the system also transfers income within each generation in a way 
that is difficult to justify. For example, the nonworking wife of  a corporate 
president typically gets a much higher rate of return on her pension benefits 
than a woman of that company who never marries. 
Third,  since the social security contribution is not directly linked to the 
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Had the system been actuarially fair from the beginning,  these problems 
would not have arisen.  Once a pay-as-you-go  system is in place, however, 
making it actuarially fair may create new problems. The principal aim of the 
paper is to evaluate the economic effects of  various reform plans that would 
eventually make the system actuarially fair. 
Specifically, Hatta and Oguchi examine the following three plans: 
1.  Switch to the Fully Funded System. This quickly increases the government 
budget surplus to the level of social security wealth before the arrival of 
the HAAP. 
2. Switch to the Actuarially Fair Sysfem.  This switches the system over to an 
actuarially  fair one before the HAAP. People in the baby boom and sub- 
sequent generations will contribute the amount that exactly matches ben- 
efits received. The budget surplus never reaches the level of social security 
wealth; the system never becomes fully funded. 
3. Gradual Shijt to the Fully Funded System. After an actuarially fair system 
is established as in plan 2, several generations pay taxes at levels greater 
than the actuarially fair amount until the system is eventually made fully 
funded. The burdens of building up the fund are shared by several gener- 
ations. 
The authors emphasize first that the Japanese social security system places 
a heavy  burden  on the  post-baby  boom generation by  transferring income 
from it to the baby boom generation. Switching the system to a fully funded 
one in one generation shifts the heavy burden to the baby boom generation. It 
also creates national saving in the switching period larger than what would be 
attained if the system were fully funded from the beginning. Switching to an 
actuarially fair but unfunded system eliminates the microeconomic problems 
of the Japanese social security system without causing instability in the tran- 
sition phase, the authors show. 
If accumulation of a budget surplus is necessary to make the system fully 
funded, it can be done by first changing the system into an actuarially fair but 
unfunded one and then gradually building up the fund by taxing several gen- 
erations. Economic effects of such a gradual shift are analyzed. 
Nursing Home Stays 
1. In “Payment Source and Episodes of Institutionalization,”  Alan M. Gar- 
ber  and Thomas E. MaCurdy explore the relation  between  the  duration of 
nursing  home stays and the source of payment  for nursing home care. The 
authors conclude that the incentive effects of the subsidies of  nursing home 
care-associated  with types of payers-may  play an important role in nurs- 
ing home utilization. 
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vate insurers begin to offer long-term care insurance, millions of middle-aged 
and elderly Americans plan for future long-term care needs, and policymakers 
debate the role that government should play in financing, delivering, and reg- 
ulating long-term care. 
Both private and public initiatives for financing long-term care need accu- 
rate projections of utilization,  but  few studies have examined the effects of 
insurance on utilization.  The size of  the insurance  subsidy effect on utiliza- 
tion, or moral hazard, is not readily inferred from observed price variation. It 
is notoriously difficult to gauge the price of nursing home care faced by con- 
sumers of this service,  in part because price variation reflects differences in 
the  characteristics  of  nursing  homes  (e.g., the quality of  nursing  services, 
meals,  and  housing  amenities).  In  the  absence  of  comprehensive,  reliable 
price data or of direct measures of  the effects of  alternate financing mecha- 
nisms on long-term care utilization, studies of the relation between payment 
source and utilization provide important clues to the likely consequences of 
changing long-term care insurance benefits. 
The measure of utilization that Garber and MaCurdy examine is the length 
of each nursing home stay. While information about the duration of spells is a 
key component, additional information is needed to complete any comprehen- 
sive picture of nursing home utilization. Comprehensive measures of utiliza- 
tion (or cumulative duration) also require information about both the likeli- 
hood that a spell will occur at all and the frequency of readmission. The length 
of an individual spell has an entirely different interpretation if it is only one of 
a series of admissions rather than a unique occurrence. 
Nursing home utilization also depends on the mode of exit, which in most 
duration analyses is of little concern. In other medical contexts, the nature of 
exit may have minimal significance because there is only one way a spell (of 
an illness, e.g.) may terminate (in death); in economic contexts, even if there 
is more than one way to end a spell (of unemployment, e.g.), the nature of the 
exit may be of secondary interest.  The type of  exit from nursing homes, in 
contrast,  has substantive economic and welfare implications. Nursing  home 
admissions terminate  in return to the  community,  transfer to a hospital,  or 
death. Although the type of  discharge clearly matters to the patient,  it  also 
affects  future  long-term  care  utilization  and  overall  health  expenditures. 
Transfer to a hospital, for example, is often a costly interruption in a lengthy 
nursing home stay, while discharge to the community may signal resumption 
of  independent living. The length of a nursing home spell, if it terminates in 
hospital admission, may be short in relation to overall utilization.  To accom- 
modate  these phenomena, the authors complement the analysis of duration 
distributions with an investigation of the association between the probabilities 
of alternate modes of exit and several other factors, including personal char- 
acteristics, payment source, and length of the nursing home admission. 
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of frail, disabled, and otherwise vulnerable elderly men and women who were 
believed to be likely to enter a nursing home. They were enrolled in the Na- 
tional Long-Term Care (Channeling) Demonstration, a randomized controlled 
trial of  case management  as a deterrent to  institutionalization. While this 
sample is not representative of  elderly Americans generally, it represents a 
group of  particular interest: persons who are expected to consume a dispro- 
portionate share of long-term care and who are likely to be excluded from the 
purchase of private long-term care insurance. If associations between payment 
source and duration patterns are significant in this sample, the relation in the 
general population might be stronger, particularly if the demand for nursing 
home are among Channeling participants is inelastic. 
As planning for and financing long-term care have achieved new promi- 
nence in policy circles, there is an urgent need for reliable estimates of  the 
effect of insurance on long-term care utilization. The authors attempt to take 
a step toward understanding the effect of insurance by measuring the associa- 
tion between payer type and utilization within a high-risk population of older 
Americans. One might argue that the absence of an association between type 
of coverage and utilization suggests that the demand for nursing home care is 
inelastic, an assumption implicit in much of the policy discussion regarding 
long-term care insurance. Many advocates of broader long-term care insur- 
ance coverage believe that widespread adoption of  long-term care insurance 
would not increase the utilization of nursing homes. 
Garber and MaCurdy’s analysis finds that the distribution of  the length of 
nursing home stays differs substantially among payer types, in ways that may 
not simply reflect selection. These differences are apparent even in a popula- 
tion of frail elderly individuals who lack social supports and are felt to have 
“unmet needs.” The differences also persist despite the control of  the addi- 
tional covariates incorporated into their model. Although their study was not 
designed to assess whether the differences in nursing home duration by payer 
are causal relations, the persistence of strong relations between payer type and 
duration of  nursing home admission despite the selection of  the population 
and the control for additional covariates suggests that the incentive effects of 
the subsidy of nursing home care may play an important role in nursing home 
utilization. 
The results of the duration analyses reported here suggest that the payment 
source is strongly associated with the length of nursing home admissions. The 
covariates have a weak independent association with duration, at least within 
this population and in the time period studied, but some of them, such as the 
presence of a severe ADL impairment, are associated with the type of  exit. 
Medicare-financed admissions are much shorter than admissions funded by 
either Medicaid or some other payment source, and there is a striking early 
peak in the hazard rate for Medicare admissions. 
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payment source. Exit probabilities reflect the “success” of  a nursing home 
admission, and they also give clues to future utilization of  long-term care. 
Nursing home spells financed by “other,” primarily private, payers last nearly 
as long as Medicaid admissions but are much more likely to end with return 
to the community. The length of  admission and payment source interact, at 
least for Medicare spells; the longer a Medicare patient is in a nursing home, 
the more likely is discharge to home. Even long Medicare admissions seem 
short in comparison to Medicaid admissions and are much more likely to end 
in  return to the community. For the Medicaid admissions, the high rate of 
discharge to hospitals and the high rate of death are discouraging signs for 
return to independent living. 
The authors emphasize that their results to date should be  viewed as sug- 
gestive findings, not as definitive answers about insurance effects. But  the 
results make it clear that a complete understanding of nursing home utilization 
must be based on an adequate characterization of paths leading to and from 
nursing homes and that it must account for multiple admissions. 
2. In  “Incentive Regulation of  Nursing Homes: Specification Tests of the 
Markov Model,” Edward C. Norton considers whether Markov models can be 
appropriately used to model transitions in and out of nursing homes. The anal- 
ysis rests on data from an experiment that tested the effects of performance- 
based reimbursement on the quality and cost of nursing home care. In prior 
work, Norton showed that the reimbursement system had a positive effect on 
both quality and cost. This paper, more narrowly focused on the use of  the 
Markov model, concludes that,  while the model may provide a reasonable 
tool for analysis of these data, it is an imperfect representation of transitions 
in nursing homes. 
The analysis in Norton’s previous work used a simple Markov model to 
estimate transition probabilities between states of health in the nursing home. 
A comparison of the probabilities for the control group (no incentives) and the 
experimental group (positive incentives) found them to be different. People in 
the experimental group stayed for a shorter time and had better outcomes. 
The simple Markov model, however, maintains several strong assumptions. 
For example,  it  assumes that  the transition probabilities are constant over 
time, independent of past states, and the same for all people. If  any of these 
assumptions are  false,  the  conclusions of  the  previous  paper  may  be  ill 
founded. This paper extends the analysis to more general models and in doing 
so subjects the simple Markov model to a series of specification tests. Most of 
the tests are done on data from the control group nursing homes only so that 
the effects of the experiment are not mixed with those of the assumptions. The 
paper tests the following series of assumptions. (1) The probability of being 
in statej next period depends only on the current state, not on past states. (2) 
The probabilities are independent of  personal  characteristics, such as age, 
sex, race, and marital status. (3) The probabilities are constant over time. (4) 
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home. (5) Nursing homes in the experimental group instantly switched to op- 
timize under the new  reimbursement system  with  no learning  period.  (6) 
P(7) = P( l)T  (the basic Markov assumption). (7) Reporting errors by nurses 
have no effect on the estimated transition probabilities. 
This paper contains a summary of the experiment done by  the National 
Center for Health Services Research and the data used in the analysis, fol- 
lowed by a brief review of Norton’s earlier results. The remainder of the paper 
is an extension of the previous analysis. 
Norton finds that the Markov model should be viewed as a reasonable but 
imperfect model of transitions in nursing homes. He concludes that research 
in this area could benefit from trying other kinds of duration models, such as 
competing hazard and semiparametric models. These models may have ad- 
vantages in speed of computation, a more flexible form, and an emphasis on 
duration and outcome that are important for public policy. 